Abstract: Four types of coercive and noncoercive interview strategies (legalistic, physical, cognitive and social) used to facilitate disclosure by high value detainees were examined in an international sample of practitioners and detainees (N=78). Mixed methods analyses confirmed that the accusatorial approach was positively correlated with physically coercive strategies (rs = .58), and negatively with forms of social persuasion (rs= -.31). In response to social strategies, detainees were more likely to d ... 
The demands of decision theory
There is a growing popular literature in psychology and behavioural economics examining the nature of choice. 1 In such literature, one often reads claims to the effect that humans do not conform to the axioms of decision theory, and thus that we are irrational. Consequently, it is claimed, our economic theories should be revised so as to better predict and explain the behaviour of genuinely human, irrational agents, rather than designed to predict behaviour of the fictional homo economicus.
2
No doubt, humans are frequently irrational, and no doubt there are serious problems with the use of decision theory as a tool to predict our behaviour. But the line of thought glossed above is too quick to concede that decision theory provides an adequate normative account of rationality itself.
Orthodox versions of decision theory, founded upon the idea of maximizing expected utility, are extremely demanding, or contain significant idealizations.
For these sorts of reasons, we might well suspect that decision theory is not an adequate theory of rationality. There are a number of ways in which this complaint could be made, and in this paper we focus on only one of them: the demand that rational agents have a complete and transitive preference ordering over possible actions. This premiss is in tension with the thought that a rational agent might regard two states of affairs as incommensurate in value. Agents who hold states of affairs to be incommensurate will have incomplete preferences.
That is, they will lack an all things considered preference for one state over the other, but they will also fail to hold the two states to be equally preferable. It has 1 E.g. Ariely [2008] ; Brafman and Brafman [2009] ; Schwartz [2003] ; Thaler and Sunstein long been known that decision theory's premisses are implausible for this reason, but little has been done to address the concern.
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To briefly illustrate what it is to hold two things to be incommensurate in value, suppose you are confronted with a terrible dilemma. Both your mother and father are in mortal danger. Your mother is attending to her garden, located in a valley, and is endangered by an imminent flood. Your father is out gathering mushrooms in the foothills of nearby mountains, and is threatened by an impending avalanche. You have time to save one or the other, but not both.
Whomever you do not save will surely die. You are very close to both your parents, both of whom are of outstanding character, and both are in good health. You have no preference that one rather than the other live. You know that you will feel the burden of this decision for the rest of your life.
But there is a complication that you have just remembered: the government has recently advertised that it will provide free grief counselling for the bereaved relatives of flood victims, but no such scheme exists for the bereaved of avalanche victims. Though you would never express such a callous-sounding preference out loud, if your mother died, you would prefer to receive the free grief counselling than not. But even so: this consideration is not enough to help you knowingly to choose between your mother and your father.
The thought that, by saving your father, you will secure free counselling for your mother's death in no way convinces you that saving your father is the right thing to do. You would still have no preference to save one or the other.
This complication is important, because it suggests that you don't take your father's survival and your mother's survival to be equally desirable. To make this point clear, we need to give a more general characterisation of the value relations that two things, A and B, can possibly stand in. The obvious possibilities are:
• B > A (B is better than A)
• A ≡ B (A and B are equal in value)
The relation of being equal in value can be defined in terms of the better than relation. 4 Two things, A and B are equal in value if, and only if:
it is not the case that A > B; it is not the case that B > A; and for all things
Is it possible for two things to stand in any other value relation than these? That is, from the assumption that you value the initial alternatives equally, it follows that you are rationally required to save your father, in order to obtain the free grief counselling. This is -for at least some agents -an implausible conclusion. Rather, it appears that we have good reason to reject the first premiss: Saving your father and saving your mother are not equal in value, but are incommensurate.
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Standard decision theory uses the preferences of individuals to determine the relevant value of outcomes. An assumption of standard decision theory is that rational agents have preferences over all outcomes that stand in a complete and transitive total ordering. But agents who take two things to be of incommensurate value violate these conditions. More precisely, agents who regard two states as incommensurate in value have incomplete preferences. For such agents, for some three outcomes x, y, z, the agent has no preference between x and y, has no preference between y and z, and yet prefers x to z. In this case: x = Save Father+; y = Save Mother; z = Save Father.
When an agent has incomplete preferences, standard decision theory is silentit gives no advice. This is because, to handle decisions under uncertainty, decision theory uses expected utility calculations. Constructing a utility function on which to base such calculations requires a complete preference ordering. Incomplete preferences block construction of the utility function, and thereby prevent us from deriving any recommendations from the theory.
(Without going into the technicalities of how utility functions are constructed 5 Some prefer to use the term 'incomparability' to describe this value relation. See, e.g. Hsieh [2008] . Ruth Chang [2002] claims that, in addition to the possibility of incomparabilityunderstood as the absence of any comparative relation -there is also the possibility of the relation of 'parity', which is a fourth comparative relation that might be described as 'rough equality'. In this paper, we ignore the alleged distinction between parity and incomparability, and assume that they can be treated identically.
[e.g. 1999: 76] argue that Bayesian conditionalisation is computationally intractable, and therefore not possible for humans. Simon [1955: 101] suggests a similar connection as we do between human cognitive limitations and the normativity of rational choice theory.
Towards a decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences
There are two principal problems that will confront anyone attempting to devise a theory of decision for agents with incomplete preferences.
Decision under uncertainty. For any given action that an agent may perform, the agent is typically uncertain what the outcome will be. Given this, we cannot simply say that it is rational to act in the way that will bring about the best outcome, for agents typically cannot know which action that is. The standard way to explain rational decision-making under uncertainty is to use expected utility. We associate with each possible outcome a cardinal measure of its desirability: its utility. Also associated with each outcome is the agent's subjective probability that the outcome will occur, conditional on having performed a given action. Rational action then, involves taking the action whose outcomes have the greatest probability-weighted utility.
As mentioned above, however, in order to ascribe to an agent a utility function, standard techniques require a complete preference ranking. Without a utility function, we cannot associate with each decision an expected utility. So if we hope to give an adequate theory of rational choice under uncertainty, we will need to find some novel way of ranking available actions.
There are some decision rules which do not require probabilities in order to be applied. Maximin, for instance, advises the agent to take the action whose worst outcome is best, relative to the worst outcome of all other actions. This extremely pessimistic decision rule is mirrored by maximax, which decides based upon the most optimistic assessment of all available actions. Both rules are absurd in their extremism. Moreover, for many realistic decisions, it is plausible that the worst possible outcome (or best possible outcome) is identical for all available actions. Whatever your greatest fear (or wish), it is possible that it will come about, no matter what you do. This suggests that maximin and maximax will end up saying that all available actions are permissible. Hardly a satisfying result.
Consequently, it would be very desirable to develop a method that retains some of the virtues of expected utility theory, but which does not require utilities.
Serial decision making.
The second problem that we will encounter concerns diachronic rationality -achieving rationally acceptable outcomes over a series of decisions. This problem arises even in cases of decision under certainty.
Suppose an agent has the following preferences:
It is very plausible to think that, in decisions under certainty, an agent is rationally required to select a maximal option. That is: the agent must choose an option that is not worse than any other option. Suppose there is no other rule governing rational choice. The following series of choices, then, is permissible.
Suppose the agent starts with A, and is offered the option to swap to B:
this represents choosing B, from the set of options A, B]
2. {B, B+} ⟼ B+
…
The agent starts by choosing B, trades up to B+, swaps to A, and then swaps back to B. Note that on the second trade, the agent is rationally required to accept B+ rather than B. If we make some mild assumptions about the psychology of our agent, we can suppose that the agent would also be willing to pay a very small sum for this trade -say ten cents. 8 But now, if we repeat the cycle of trades, including this small payment, the agent will keep paying out more and more money, while merely cycling through the options B, B+, A.
In short, agents with incomplete preferences are vulnerable to moneypumps. That said, diachronic rationality is a challenge for many theories of rational choice, and it might be that the sorts of measures proposed to assist agents with complete preferences to avoid money-pumps can be adapted to agents with incomplete preferences. 9 Partly for this reason, and partly because it is a large topic in its own right, we propose to ignore the second problem in this paper.
Finally, our project is modest in a further respect: we do not go so far as to establish a particular decision theory that we believe will satisfactorily address the problem of decision under uncertainty. Rather: we try to establish a 8 See Mandler [2005: 261] for formal characterisation of the necessary assumptions. 9 In particular, it has been suggested that agents who experience preference reversals will need to be capable of making and committing to plans in order to avoid money pumps.
Perhaps such resoluteness will also allow agents with incomplete preferences to avoid money pumps. See McClennen [1990] or Bratman [1998] for a discussion of such views of rational agency. Alternatively, perhaps backward-looking agents that consider their past decisions when making their current ones will be able to avoid money pumps. See Mandler
[2005] for a discussion.
A referee has pointed out to us that a parallel money-pump concern has been raised for defenders of imprecise credences [Elga 2010; White 2010] . To that end, the defender of incomplete preferences may be able to take inspiration from James Joyce's [2010] responses to those objections.
criterion that any adequate decision theory must satisfy. Our criterion is a close cousin of a dominance principle, and we call it Competitiveness.
Competitiveness
One of the least controversial principles of rational choice is Dominance. Here is how it is introduced in a classic paper by Nozick [1969: 118, variables amended for consistency].
Dominance Principle:
If there is a partition of states of the world such that relative to it, action alpha weakly dominates action beta, then alpha should be performed rather than beta.
Action alpha weakly dominates action beta for person P iff, for each state of the world, P either prefers the consequence of alpha to the consequence of beta, or is indifferent between the two consequences, and for some state of the world, P prefers the consequence of alpha to the consequence of beta.
As Nozick goes on to show, this principle is too permissive. There are some partitions of states of the world such that a manifestly irrrational action will be required by the Dominance Principle. Suppose you hear an air-raid siren. You can shelter or ignore it. Fatalistically, you think: either I'm going to die in the raid, or I won't. Whichever way things turn out, I would prefer to spend less time in an uncomfortable shelter, so I will ignore the warning. This reasoning appeals to dominance, but ignores the fact that the probability of dying is much lower if you shelter. There is a probabilistic dependency between the action you choose and the state of the world, at least on the death-survival partition.
For many decision problems, however, it is possible to identify a partition such that the probability of a given world-state is independent of what action you take. For those decision problems, relative to those partitions, the Dominance Principle above gives seemingly impeccable advice. Henceforth, we will be discussing only cases where this probabilistic independence obtains, so will omit the explicit relativisation to a partition.
Suppose an agent faces a decision problem with the structure illustrated in Now consider a different principle, which we take to be at least as plausible as Nozick's original: an action alpha is rationally obligatory if, for every way the world could be, the consequences of alpha are not worse than the consequences of all alternative actions, and for some way the world could be the consequences of alpha are better than the consequences of all alternative actions. We suggest that our intuition that the first option in Table 1 is rationally obligatory is best explained by this principle.
Now this principle appears to build on a simpler, and even more compelling, principle: that an action is rationally permissible if, for every way the world could be, its consequences are no worse than the consequences of all alternative actions. In such a case, let's say that the action is 'competitive' and call the principle that competitive actions are rationally permissible 'Competitiveness'.
Competitiveness:
If an action alpha is competitive, it is rationally permissible to perform alpha.
Our variant on Nozick's dominance principle can now be reformulated as follows:
Strong Competitiveness: If one or more actions are competitive, and other actions are not competitive, it is rationally required to perform a competitive action.
Strong Competitiveness explains why option 1 is the only permissible action in the above example: it is the only competitive action. But for dialectical purposes in this paper, it will suffice to defend the weaker Competitiveness principle.
Any adequate decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences will respect Competitiveness, we claim. It might be thought that this is too modest a claim to be of interest. But one of the more promising recent proposals to reform decision theory, intended precisely to give advice to agents with incomplete preferences, violates this requirement.
Hare's prospectism
Hare argues that both his proposals have genuine appeal, and he leans towards one called prospectism.
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The key idea behind prospectism is to make up for the difficulty caused by incomplete preferences by appealing to possible coherent completions of the preferences with which the agent begins. For our agent with the preferences: B ≁ A+ > A ≁ B, the following are some coherent completions:
Using these possible completions of an agent's preferences, we can define utility functions. Hare's prospectism says that an action is rationally permissible if (and only if), according to some coherent completion of the agent's preferences, that action has maximal expected utility [2010: 242-3] .
Note that, in all of these coherent completions, we have to respect the original preference for A+ over A, so A will never have a higher utility than A+.
In some completions, however, A+ will have maximal utility, and in others, B will. Consequently, applying prospectism to a choice under certainty between the above three outcomes, it will be permissible to choose A+ or B, but impermissible to choose A, because there is no completion of preferences according to which A's utility is maximal.
Prospectism and decision under uncertainty
10 Prospectism is not entirely new. An extremely similar idea has been defended by Paul Weirich [2004: 70] , and Weirich cites a predecessor of the idea due to I. J. Good [1952] . We take our criticisms of Hare's proposal to generalize to Weirich's account also.
Consider the following case of decision under uncertainty, given by Hare. Then you invite me to walk away with one of the boxes. [Hare 2010: 239-40] It is obvious that we may take the right box. The important question is:
Suppose I lack preferences between my getting item
must you take the right box? Is it rationally permissible to take the left box?
Because your preferences are incomplete, standard decision theory is silent on the matter. Hare claims that there are prima facie 'powerful' arguments both for and against the rational permissibility of taking the left box. 11 This sort of reasoning has clear echoes of the Reflection principle -though it seems less vulnerable to the sorts of problem cases that have been raised against Reflection, given those cases tend to exploit future states in which the agent is not rational [Christensen 1991], or is in receipt of very special information that is inaccessible to others [Elga 2000 ]. Neither of those sorts of concerns seems relevant here.
A further, indirect, consideration in favour of deferring to the preferences of my future self is that this idea features heavily in Krister Bykvist's [2006] elegant account of how to make prudent decisions in anticipation that one's future preferences will depend upon one's present choices.
Hare's second argument for this conclusion is more complicated, and appeals to an analogous case, which we simplify as follows:
One opaque box
Based on the toss of a coin, you put either item A or B in a box, without showing me which. You then offer me the box and a dollar, or just the box without the dollar.
In this game, it is rationally required that I take the box plus the dollar. But in its decision-theoretic structure, this game is extremely similar to Two Opaque
Boxes. The decision tables of the games are given in Tables 2 and 3 .
A is in right B is in right Take the prospect associated with an action to be the possible outcomes that might come about if I take that action, paired with my credences in those outcomes. 13 In One Opaque Box,
• The prospect of taking the box and the dollar is: { +, 0.5 , +, 0.5 }. 13 Hare allows that the relevant credences will be different, depending upon whether one favours causal decision theory or evidential decision theory. Thus his defence of prospectism remains neutral on that dispute. For all the examples discussed in this paper, the dispute between evidentialists and causalists is irrelevant.
• The prospect of taking the box alone is: { , 0.5 , , 0.5 }.
The evaluation of an action, in standard decision theory, is a function of the prospect of that action. The utilities for the various outcomes are multiplied by the probability of those outcomes to give an expected utility associated with that prospect. In this case, there is no utility function that can be assigned to the four possible outcomes because of the incompleteness of my preferences. If we accept this principle, however, then we can argue that we must take the right box in Two Opaque Boxes, as follows:
1. Taking the box and the dollar is rationally required in One Opaque Box.
The prospects of this game are identical to the prospects of Two Opaque
Boxes. (And the prospect of taking the right box, in particular, is identical to the prospect of taking the box and the dollar.)
3. Prospects Determine Permissibility.
Therefore:
4. Taking the right box is rationally required in Two Opaque Boxes.
Drawing inspiration from this argument, Hare develops the theory we have explained above: prospectism. Prospectism entails the principle Prospects Determine Permissibility.
Returning to Two Opaque Boxes, it is easy to see why prospectism entails that it is rationally required to take the right box. In all coherent completions of your preferences, the utility of A+ will be greater than the utility of A, and the utility of B+ will be greater than B. The expected utility of each action is given by the following equations.
EU(Right) = 0.5(A+) + 0.5(B+)
Accordingly, the expected utility of taking the right box must be greater than that of taking the left box, for all possible completions. So prospectism entails that it is impermissible to take the left box.
Dominance reasoning with incommensurate values
Given the strong structural similarity between Two Opaque Boxes and One
Opaque Box, why do we claim that what is rationally permissible is different?
Consider the following sort of rationale that an agent could employ. I have no preference between these. So however the world turns out, I
have no preference between the outcome of either action.
In the case of One Opaque Box, the situation is different. If item A is in the box, then there are two possible outcomes (A+ and A) and I prefer one of these. The preferred outcome will come about if I take the box and the dollar. If item B is in the box, then again there are two possible outcomes (B+ and B) and I prefer one of these. The preferred outcome will come about if I take the box and the dollar. So however the world turns out, I prefer the outcome of taking the box and dollar over taking the box alone.
In the second case, the sort of reasoning being used is clearly dominance reasoning, as already explained above.
In Two Opaque boxes, dominance reasoning -strictly understoodgives no advice because, for each way the world might be, it is not the case that one option is at least as good as the other. However, as we also argued above, we can weaken the notion of dominance to give us the principle of In a different context, Amartya Sen [1997; 2000] has argued that consequentialists do better to adopt a 'maximizing' form of consequentialism, rather than an 'optimizing'
form. The maximizing consequentialist merely seeks to bring about outcomes that are no worse than any alternative. The optimizing consequentialist seeks to bring about an outcome that is at least as good as all alternatives. If there are incommensurate goods, or there is some other failure of the assumptions of completeness and transitivity in the betterness relation, then the optimizing goal may be impossible -there may be no outcome that is at least as good as all others -but the maximizing goal remains viable. The adoption of a rule permitting 'competitive' actions as opposed to a rule permitting only dominant actions complements, in decision theory, Sen's proposal for ethics more generally.
purposes of decision theory, identical! That is, although the decision matrices of these decisions differ, they do not differ in their prospects. Consequently, prospectism implies that agents who treat these decisions differently are irrational. Of course, some rational agents might think these two decisions are identical insofar as rational choice is concerned, but it is very plausible to think that it is rationally permissible, for an agent with preferences like those described, to treat the decisions differently.
The committed prospectivist, however, may insist that we are begging the question. If prospectism is false, then what is wrong with the apparently tempting arguments that Hare presents for the view?
The considerations argument
The first of Hare's arguments, in full, is as follows:
There is a consideration of which I am aware that counts in favour of my taking the right, rather than the left box: I will get a dollar if I take the right box, no dollar if I take the left box. But there is no consideration of which I am aware that counts in favour of my taking the left, rather than the right box. So, it is rationally impermissible for me to take the left box.
It is rationally impermissible to do something when I have no reason to do it, and a reason to do something else. [Hare 2010: 240] Setting this out even more explicitly, Hare seems to have the following argument in mind:
1. If you have a reason to make decision X rather than decision Y and no reason to make decision Y rather than decision X then you ought to make decision X.
2. In Two Opaque Boxes you have a reason to take the right box rather than the left box (i.e. your getting a dollar).
3. In Two Opaque Boxes you do not have a reason to take the left box rather than the right box.
4. In Two Opaque Boxes you ought to take the right box.
Premiss (1) does look very appealing. We will call it the Reasons principle, and will not dispute it. Premises (2) and (3) to the right box. Second, if the coin toss came up heads they added a suit (S) to each box. Your preferences are as follows:
You find all outcomes involving A incommensurable with respect to outcomes involving B, except you very strongly prefer (B + S) to any outcome involving A.
After all, this way you can be comfortable most of the time but still wow your bosses at the monthly meeting so this outcome is more desirable than any other. 
The argument from analogy
The second argument Hare gives relies upon the analogy between Two Opaque Boxes and One Opaque Box. In the two cases, the decisions are very similar. In particular, the corresponding prospects are identical. In One Opaque Box it is rationally required that we take the box and the dollar. If Prospects Determine Permissibility is true, then it is rationally required to take the right hand box in Two Opaque Boxes.
As we have indicated above, we are dubious about Prospects Determine Permissibility. We claim that that premiss is false. We have a further complaint, however, which is that the intuition regarding One Opaque Box does not straightforwardly support prospectism. Prospectism requires that we 'take the sugar' only where our credences are perfectly balanced between the relevant alternatives. But the intuitive appeal of taking the box and the dollar in One
Opaque Box is surely driven by dominance considerations. As such, the intuition is insensitive to the credences we have in the different possibilities.
Consider a variant on One Opaque Box where we are told that the contents of the box was determined by the roll of a die. If the die landed 6, A was placed inside the box. Otherwise, B was placed inside the box. Now your choice is whether to take the box alone, or the box with a dollar.
Obviously, it is still rationally required that you take the box with the dollar. One might have thought, then, that prospectism would entail that you must take the right box in a similarly modified version of Two Opaque Boxes, where if the die landed six, A was placed in the right hand box, and otherwise B was placed in the right hand box. But this is not so. The prospects of these two games are not identical in their unsweetened actions:
• One opaque box, using die, take box alone: { , We conclude that prospectism is an implausibly radical departure from intuition, and Hare's affection for it is insufficiently motivated, given it violates a natural extension of dominance reasoning.
Conclusion
We conclude that a satisfactory decision theory will give advice to agents with incomplete preferences. Such a theory should satisfy Competitiveness. This rules out proposals such as prospectism. There is also significant tension between Competitiveness and any theory that accepts that two decisions are equally desirable if they have the same prospects. 16 While Competitiveness is modest, then, it nevertheless rules out a broad class of possible theories.
P1. If none of the possible outcomes associated with a given action A 1 are worse than any of the possible outcomes associated with any alternative action A i , then A 1 is rationally permissible.
P2. If one of the possible outcomes associated with a given action A 1 is worse than one of the possible outcomes associated with an alternative action A i , and no possible outcomes associated with A 1 are better than the possible outcomes associated with A i , then A 1 is rationally prohibited.
These principles would entail that taking the right box is rationally required in variants of Two Opaque Boxes where the credences are not equal. However, these principles would also implausibly entail that no decision is rationally permissible in some cases (as there will be scenarios where P2 will imply that all decisions are rationally prohibited). As such, this alternative theory is also unsatisfactory.
